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Using critical discourse analysis, this article explores the discursive 
self-representations of the EU in its official documents related to 
the  European  Neighbourhood  Policy.  Its  main  claim  is  that  the 
EU’s  position  towards  its  neighbourhood  basically  oscillates  be-
tween two contradictory positions – that of a power centre, asym-
metrically  dominating  its  neighbourhood,  and  that  of  an  equal 
among equals, thus offering a more benign face to its neighbours. 
Two discursive areas frequently mentioned in the documents are 
analysed:  the  notion  of  joint  ownership  and  the  EU’s  stance  to-
wards the frozen conflict, showing that each of the two facets of 
EU’s  identity  may  become  dominant  under  particular  circum-
stances. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
The European Neighbourhood Policy is a truly complex policy. In-
deed, if we take into account the cumbersome evolution of the pol-
icy, the policy’s multi-faceted nature comes as no surprise. While it 
started out as a policy aimed at the Eastern neighbours, the biggest 
and most important of these, Russia, rejected its participation even 
before  the  policy  was  launched.  Meanwhile,  to  soothe  the  EU’s 
southern members, who felt that the EU’s attention had tilted too 
much and for too long to the East, the Southern Dimension was 
added to the original project, hence creating the two regional direc-
tions characterising the policy until today. Finally, after Georgia’s 
Rose  Revolution,  the  diversity  among  the  ENP  partner  countries 
was further increased by adding the three Southern Caucasian States 
into the basket.  
 
While this alone would render a reasonable level of consistence for 
the  policy  extraordinarily  difficult  to  achieve,  another  difficulty 
with the policy lay in the ways the policy was perceived by individ-
ual EU member states (cf. Kratochvíl 2006). Some, notably the new 
EU members in Eastern Europe, saw the policy clearly as a pre-
enlargement  strategy  and  fought  vigorously  for  the  clichéd 
‘membership perspective’ for their shoo-ins (for the connection be-
tween the ENP and enlargement, see Kelley 2006, Tulmets 2006). 
Others,  in  particular  southern  member  states,  favoured  more  co-
operation with the states on the southern coast of the Mediterranean 
without,  however,  pushing  for  these  countries’  membership. 
Finally, a number of old EU members, painstakingly aware of their 
populations’ enlargement fatigue and growing fear of immigrants, 
came to understand the policy as an enlargement substitute.    
 
However, the main thesis of this article is that besides the South-
East tension and the enlargement-non-enlargement tension, there is 
a third source of friction which has so far been hidden from the ana-
lysts’ eyes. This tension is rooted in the Union’s self-perception as 
the dominant power and, at the same time, a benign power which 
can transform its neighbourhood by the token of its mere existence 
and attractiveness (for a discussion on the EU’s nature as a benign 
power,  see,  for  instance,  Manners  2002).  I  define  the  dominant 
power as a power that plays the key role in the international system Kratochvíl: Discursive Constructions in the Neighbourhood    7 
or in its regional subsystem and that uses its asymmetrical position 
to  make  other  actors  in  the  system  comply  with  the  dominant 
power’s requirements. The benign power, on the other hand, is a 
power  that  strives  to  deals  with  other  actors  without  recourse  to 
force, intimidation or deliberate manipulation and that aims at eq-
uality in the external relationships.  
 
In other words, the research question I ask is which of the two ele-
ments (dominance and benigness) of EU’s role identity vis-à-vis its 
neighbours becomes dominant in EU’s discourse about the ENP. 
There are two areas where the discursive clash between these two 
elements in the EU’s self-perception causes great difficulties within 
the ENP. The first is the principle of partnership and joint owner-
ship (Tulmets 2006): On the one hand, the European Union is eager 
to present its power influence in the neighbourhood as benign, and 
hence the official documents and speeches on the ENP teem with 
references to the equality of the partnership, shared values, com-
monly agreed priorities, etc. But once we start to explore the EU’s 
rhetoric in more detail, we will soon realise that the principle of 
joint ownership is seriously eroded by the EU’s belief that it is pri-
marily the Union itself who should define the contents of partner 
countries’ reforms and, in particular, who should decide whether the 
partner countries are performing badly or not. Hence, even though 
the  benign  elements  remain  in  place,  EU’s  dominance  looms 
equally relevant in the EU’s documents. 
 
Secondly, the contradictory nature of a benign power reveals itself 
very clearly in the way the EU talks about security issues, in par-
ticular potential sources of threat to its security, such as frozen con-
flicts. On the one hand, the Union as a friendly actor (and also as a 
composite actor whose stance is frequently on the verge of frag-
menting into individual national positions) does not wish to take 
sides and tries to remain strictly neutral in these conflicts. This neu-
trality,  coupled  with  the  intrusion  of  outside  powers,  however, 
slows down any progress toward solutions to these conflicts. As a 
result, the EU’s self-perception as a dominant power is seriously 
challenged since apparently, the EU is not able to stabilise its own 
neighbourhood,  not  speaking  about  the  global  projection  of  its 
power. Interestingly, the ambiguity surrounding the question of the 
EU’s role in the neighbourhood feeds back into the discussion about   European Political Economy Review  
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the two tensions mentioned above and hence can further reinforce 
the division between the Eastern and Southern Dimensions of the 
ENP since the EU stresses its dominant nature in the East, hence 
adopting a position of a teacher, while maintaining a more equal, 
benign stance in the South, thus playing the role a friend. 
 
These two discursive areas were chosen for two reasons: First they 
constitute  the  strongest  and  weakest  element  of  EU’s  policies: 
While the voluntary spread of EU’s norms based on local ownership 
is clearly the most effective tool the EU has at its disposal, its se-
curity policy is still rather underdeveloped, fragmented and at times 
contradictory. Second, the two notions are applied differently in the 
East and in the South which may reveal some interesting differences 




2. Conceptual Framework: Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
The methodology used in this article is based on critical discourse 
analysis  (Fairclough  1992,  1995;  Wodak,  Meyer  2001;  Toolan 
2002). We analyse documents on the ENP published by the Euro-
pean Commission. We start from the assumptions that (1) texts and 
discourses are not reducible to material conditions and that (2) dis-
course analysis can reveal much about the authors of the texts, the 
structure of meanings they assign to themselves and others, and the 
overall interpretation of their social environment. At the same time, 
critical discourse analysis maintains that the social world cannot be 
reduced to discourse only and that discourse is closely related to 
actual social practices, such as construction of power asymmetries, 
exclusionary practices aiming at hierarchisation of actors, and as-
cribing positive and negative values to their actions. In short, dis-
course is the primary vehicle through which ideology can be repro-
duced and thus have an effect on society (or international relations, 
for that matter).  
 
Discursive constructions, especially those expounding relations to 
other actors, are directly related to the role identities the self is pre-
pared to play in the particular environment. For instance, locating 
oneself at the top of a hierarchically structured cluster of actors im-Kratochvíl: Discursive Constructions in the Neighbourhood    9 
plies a superior identity for the self and the self’s right to asymmet-
rically  influence  the  others.  Obviously,  others  advocate  different 
discourses that may or may not be compatible with the discursive 
strategies of the self and the resultant identity of both self and others 
depend on the outcome of clashes among the competing discourses.  
 
We start from the structural-synchronic analysis of texts, exploring 
their internal structure and the differences in stresses in the pre-
ambles and in the technical parts dealing with the policy’s substance 
and  implementation.  Then  we  move  forward  to  intertextuality, 
comparing the changes in the texts in time (comparative diachronic 
analysis),  whereby  we  are  mainly  interested  in  the  question  of 
whether the dominant principles highlighted in the older documents 
retain their importance in the newer texts or whether they recede to 
the background. Finally, this allows us to make the final move to 
the analysis of the social context, showing what impact the inconsis-
tencies in the application of the leading principles might have for 
the policy as a whole (importance of context for critical theory is 
also stressed in Campbell 1992, Fierke 2001).  
 
In this study, we focused on the analysis of seven documents pub-
lished by the European Commission. These documents cover a pe-
riod of almost exactly five years, from March 2003 to April 2008, 
thus describing the policy’s evolution from its early beginning (the 
first  communication  on  Wider  Europe  (COM(2003)  104  final), 
through the Strategy Paper (COM(2004) 373 final), to two docu-
ments calling for improvements in the policy (COM(2006) 726 final 
and COM(2007) 774 final) and three reports assessing the progress 
in the policy’s implementation (COM(2008) 164, SEC(2008) 402 
and SEC(2008) 395).
2 All of these documents were drawn by the 
bureaucrats of the European Commission and while some may have 
different authors (in particular the three progress reports), their con-
tents are finally always harmonised within the ENP Coordination 
Unit of the EC. 
                                                 
2 In the analysed sample, no Action Plans were included since these do not con-
tain virtually any references to joint ownership. While it may be true that the 
Action Plans reflect more than other documents the equal nature of the partner-
ships, this is not evident from the texts themselves and hence not identifiable 
through discourse analysis.   European Political Economy Review  
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3. The EU as a Dominant and Benign Actor   
 
All  analysed  documents  are  framed  in  the  general  understanding 
that it is the European Union that is the key actor in the region as 
well as the actor that is behind the reform and modernisation drive 
in the neighbouring countries. The best metaphor describing this 
position of the EU is that of a teacher: The EU is the dominant actor 
here and the actor who leads others and aims at their modernisation, 
social learning and adoption of the EU model of governance. It is 
usually in the introductory parts of the documents where explicit 
references to this double role of the EU are mentioned. The first 
document  (COM(2003))  is  already  very  clear  on  both  of  these 
points: It starts by reiterating that  
 
“An enlarged Union of 25 countries, with a combined population of more 
than 450 million and GDP of almost € 10000 billion, will fundamentally 
increase the political, geographic and economic weight of the EU on the 
European continent” (COM(2003): 3)  
 
This document also entails the clearest allusion to the EU as a be-
nign power which positively influences its neighbourhood:  
 
“The EU has a duty, not only towards its citizens and those of the new 
member states, but also towards its present and future neighbours to en-
sure continuing social cohesion and economic dynamism. The EU must 
act to promote the regional and sub-regional cooperation and integration 
that are preconditions for political stability, economic development and 
the reduction of poverty and social divisions in our shared environment” 
(COM(2003): 3) 
 
The same ethos has remained remarkably constant over time as can 
be demonstrated by citing a document published three and a half 
years later. Here, the double nature of the EU as both a benevolent 
actor and the most powerful actor is put even more pithily:  
 
“The premise of the European Neighbourhood Policy is that the EU has a 
vital  interest  in  seeing  greater  economic  development  and  stability  and 
better  governance  in  its  neighbourhood.  The  responsibility  for  this  lies 
primarily with the countries themselves, but the EU can substantially en-
courage and support their reform efforts” (COM(2006): 2)  
 Kratochvíl: Discursive Constructions in the Neighbourhood    11 
This self-perception is coupled with the growing stress on an EU-
centred  understanding  of  the  European  continent.  For  instance, 
while the original initiative consistently talked about the “new EU 
neighbourhood  policy”,  thus  keeping  up  the  distinction  between 
“EU” and “Europe” (cf. COM(2003)), all later documents refer to 
the European Neighbourhood Policy and hence make an EU policy 
identical with a “Europe’s policy”. It is indeed striking that even 
though the EU covers less than half of the continent’s territory, it is 
able to discursively push through the identification of the two no-
tions to such an extent that it is often accepted by outsiders as well. 
Similarly, although the catchwords are “reform” and “modernisa-
tion” in all the documents, there is little doubt that the EU stands at 
the centre of these reforms, and this interpretation frequently comes 
to  the  fore,  for  instance  in  the  phrase  “implementation  of  EU-
oriented reforms” (COM(2008): 2). 
 
The following two sections explore the mutual relation of these two 
roles of the EU by exploring (1) the joint ownership principle; (2) 
the EU’s stance in regard to the frozen conflicts in the neighbour-
hood.  
 
3.1 Case I: Discursive Treatment of the Joint Ownership Notion 
 
It is not difficult to understand why the principle of partnership and 
that of joint ownership constitute a key pillar of the whole policy.
3 
The main reason for its relevance lies in the EU’s experience with 
past projects whose failure was seen as directly originating in the 
missing identification with the projects on the part of the partner 
countries. One such project is the Northern Dimension. Here, the 
frustration caused by the low level of responsiveness on the side of 
Russian authorities was so high that an allusion to the Northern Di-
mension as a negative example of unsatisfactory ownership even 
made it into the Strategy Paper on the ENP which says that “the im-
portance of local ownership is one of the most pertinent lessons that 
can be drawn from the Northern Dimension” (COM(2004): 21). Af-
ter the decision was taken to include the Southern dimension in the 
                                                 
3  Both of these are frequently mentioned in the bilateral Action Plans between 
the  EU  and  the  partner  countries.  See  ENP  –  Reference  Documents, 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm    European Political Economy Review  
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neighbourhood policy, the importance of the principle further rose. 
Again, the reason is clear: The lack of a co-ownership by both the 
EU and the countries of the Southern Mediterranean belonged to the 
most frequently raised critiques in the Euro-Mediterranean Partner-




The term “joint ownership” is first introduced in the Strategy Paper 
from May 2004. Here, it is presented as the first substantial princi-
ple (followed by differentiation), and it is underlined as “essential” 
(COM(2004):  8).  However,  the  emphasis  on  ownership  is  omni-
present in all documents which swell with phrases related to the 
principle, such as “an equal stake”, “shared interests”, “joint ap-
proaches”, “mutual commitments” or priorities “defined by com-
mon consent” (see COM(2003), COM(2004), COM(2006) etc.). 
 
A  mirror  reflection  of  the  extreme  efforts  to  underline  the  joint 
ownership is the strict avoidance of the term political conditionality, 
which by many, especially in the South, is seen as condescending 
and patronising. In its stead the key word used is “benchmarks”, 
sometimes even “agreed benchmarks”. The Commission maintains 
that benchmarks “offer greater predictability and certainty for the 
partner  countries  than  traditional  ‘conditionality’”  (COM(2003): 
16), but the substance of the measure, irrespective of its name, re-
mains  virtually  the  same.  Notwithstanding  the  claim  that  bench-
marking can “ensure national ownership and commitment” (ibid.), 
benchmarks are undeniably factual criteria specifying under which 
conditions  rewards  from  the  EU  are  bestowed  upon  the  partner 
country.  
 
However, a major difference between benchmarks and direct politi-
cal  conditionality  lies  in  the  fact  that  benchmarks  (1)  are  more 
loosely connected to rewards and (2) their determination is – unlike 
with political conditionality – usually preceded by a period of con-
                                                 
4  Although the EU may have been slow in recognising the relevance of joint 
ownership and partnership, it is worth noting that it is still the only major inter-
national actor who realises that the perceived power asymmetry between the 
Union and its partners might be detrimental to its efforts at speeding up the re-
forms in the partner countries (I thank one of the anonymous referees for this 
insight). Kratochvíl: Discursive Constructions in the Neighbourhood    13 
sultations. Benchmarks thus leave space for deliberation and social 
learning which may ultimately lead to a greater level of real joint 
ownership of assessment criteria thus established.
5  
 
Even with this qualification, the excessive stress on joint ownership 
and commonly agreed benchmarks generates the illusion of a com-
pletely equal partnership between the EU and the partner countries, 
thus giving the EU a penchant to continue exclusively in its benign 
nature. This illusion can be maintained as long as the documents 
stay on the general level. However, once we descend to concrete 
measures provided for in the bilateral Action Plans, the asymmetry, 
i.e. the conviction of the EU that it can and indeed should define to 
contents of the Action Plans between the EU and the partner count-
ries becomes clearly visible. In other words, in the general, declara-
tory parts of the Commission’s communications, the joint owner-
ship coupled with the image of the EU as a benign actor is preva-
lent, but in the practical parts where more space is dedicated to de-
tails of the implementation of the partnership, the EU’s dominance 
takes over.  
 
The clearest example of this asymmetry is legal harmonisation, one 
of the most fundamental tools used by the EU, also used in the pro-
cess of enlargement. Legal harmonisation means, to put it bluntly, a 
one-sided adoption of EU-inspired legal norms in the legal systems 
of the partner countries. To give just a few illustrations, partners are 
“encouraged to approximate their legislation to that of the Internal 
Market” (COM(2003): 5), they are also asked to adopt measures 
leading  to  their  convergence  in  areas  of  more  general  normative 
harmonisation as diverse as the Bologna Process and the Lisbon 
Agenda (cf. COM(2007): 9), and their reforms should aim  at “close 
approximation to the fundamental standards prevailing in the EU” 
(COM(2008): 3). Even though obviously, legal harmonisation also 
depends  on  the  partner  countries,  this  is  bracketed  in  the  texts, 
which  resemble  rather  homework  given  by  a  teacher  than  com-
monly agreed documents. 
 
                                                 
5  I thank one of the anonymous referees for drawing my attention to the differ-
ence  between  benchmarks  and  political  conditionality  and  to  the  relation  of 
benchmarks to social learning and deliberation.   European Political Economy Review  
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The prior analysis has focused on the structural-synchronic aspects 
of these documents’ textual structure, but the same trend is notice-
able also in the diachronic sense. Not only was the word “EU” re-
placed by “European” in the policy’s name soon after its inception, 
but also the spatial directions have been reversed. While the first 
document still speaks about the EU “drawing closer” to the neigh-
bours (COM(2003): 3), thus reflecting the geographical extension 
of the EU’s territory, the subsequent documents turn this on its head 
and speak about the neighbours approaching the EU. This is indeed 
surprising since this reversal is present even when geography is the 
primary focus. For instance, the Strategy Paper from 2004 begins 
the section “geographic coverage” by saying that “the ENP is ad-
dressed  to  the  EU’s  existing  neighbours  and  to  those  that  have 
drawn closer to the EU as a result of enlargement” (COM(2004): 7). 
This reversal of geographic imagery then dissolves in the general 
call for measures “which will bring the partner countries closer to 
the EU in a number of priority fields” (COM(2004): 9) and finally 
smoothly transmutes into the above mentioned convergence through 
the adoption of the acquis. 
 
This asymmetry does not pertain only to the EU’s agenda-setting 
power but also to the unequal obligations taken up by the EU and its 
member states on the one hand and the partner countries on the 
other. The ultimate embodiment of the EU’s dominance in the re-
gion is the evaluation mechanism. Although the Commission insists 
that the principle of joint ownership means that “both the ENP part-
ner country and the EU can hold each other accountable for living 
up to their mutual commitments” (COM(2007): 3), the evaluating 
mechanisms do not provide for any institutionalised course of ac-
tion in which the partner countries could hold the EU accountable. 
 
This construction of the evaluation process is also the reason why 
one can hardly find any references to joint ownership in the pro-
gress reports. These reports are written in a seemingly neutral style, 
merely reiterating the areas in which progress was achieved and the 
areas where there is still a lack thereof. However, as it is the Euro-
pean Commission who prepares the reports, and no mirror reports 
of a similar level of importance are drafted by the partner countries, 
it  clearly  betrays  the  asymmetry  in  the  relationship.  In  order  to 
make obvious that the reports do contain a strong normative ele-Kratochvíl: Discursive Constructions in the Neighbourhood    15 
ment, we can make a brief comparison of two progress reports, one 
assessing  Egypt  (SEC(2008)a)  and  the  other  assessing  Ukraine 
(SEC(2008)b). Let us note that the overall evaluating report on the 
implementation of the ENP in 2007 (COM(2008)) states that Uk-
raine belongs among the four best performers. As a result, we could 
reasonably  expect  that  the  report  on  Ukraine  will  contain  fewer 
negative references than that on Egypt since both of them are of ap-
proximately the same length (twenty and eighteen pages). 
 
However, when counting negative references to lacking progress, 
such as “no progress can be reported”, “no real progress has been 
made”,  etc.,  we  come  to  the  surprising  conclusion  that  whereas 
there are seventeen such references in the case of Ukraine, there is 
only one such negative allusion in the report on Egypt. This shows 
not only that the reports, without a doubt, give the EU’s assessment 
and not just some “objective” depiction of reality, but also that the 
Commission strongly differentiates between the partner countries. 
Even though Ukraine is (most probably unjustly) applauded for its 
reform zeal, it is also criticised in places. The probable explanation 
for this strange mixture of praise and critique lies in the Commis-
sion’s understanding that Ukraine, as a potential future candidate, 
can  be  dealt  with  in  a  more  straightforward  manner,  resembling 
more closely the assessment reports published during the last en-
largement process. Egypt, on the other hand, retains the more dis-
tanced position of only being the EU’s long-term neighbour, and so 
the report is much more restrained. In other words, with Egypt, the 
principle  of  joint  ownership  only  recedes  to  the  background, 
whereas with Ukraine it is entirely overruled by the EU’s domi-
nance, which is so much present in the enlargement process. 
 
3.2  Case II: Discursive Treatment of Conflict Settlement  
 
While the previous example highlighted a situation in which the 
tension between the benign and dominant elements in the EU’s na-
ture was resolved in favour of the EU’s dominance, the second ex-
ample  we  have  chosen  points  in  the  other  direction.  Frozen  (or 
sometimes  even  actual)  conflicts  are  the  greatest  problem  in  the 
whole policy. The EU gropes uncertainly for the solution of the 
conflicts, without however being willing to engage directly in the 
conflict settlement. This is caused first by the fact that some part-  European Political Economy Review  
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ners are parties to the conflicts on opposite sides (Israel – Palestin-
ian  Territories,  Armenia  –  Azerbaijan),  which  increases  the  pre-
mium for the EU on remaining neutral. Secondly, a number of ex-
ternal actors are involved in the conflicts as well – ranging from 
Russia to the United States to Iran.  
 
At the same time, however, frozen conflicts are seen as the first pri-
ority by many partner countries (Georgia, Moldova, Palestinian Ter-
ritories, Armenia, Azerbaijan, etc.). Hence, these partner countries, 
and particularly their political elites, would like to see finding  solu-
tions to these conflict as the first priority on the list of priorities in 
the Action Plans as well (cf. Kratochvíl, Lippert 2007). As is obvi-
ous from the Action Plans, this wish has never come true, and the 
documents list frozen conflicts as being on a par with other priori-
ties. In addition, while in other priority areas, very specific goals are 
frequently mentioned, in the sections dedicated to frozen conflicts, 
the EU typically stays on the very general level and talks about con-
structive cooperation or the need for confidence building. Because 
of the high visibility of the conflicts and their extremely sensitive 
nature, the relatively low importance given to the solution of frozen 
conflicts  by  the  EU  does  not  prevent  the  partner  countries  from 
coupling their expectations of the EU exactly with these conflicts, 
as  recently  seen  in  Georgia  (see  Emerson,  Noutcheva,  Popescu 
2007).  
 
The  resultant  problem  is  that  the  EU  not  only  repeatedly  avoids 
proposals for solutions but also repeatedly declares that it is not 
ready to engage in the conflicts, frozen, “simmering” or hot. As an 
alternative, the EU tries to transform the ominous territory of con-
flict  resolution  into  a  safe  ground  for  spreading  its  soft  power 
through conflict prevention and legal harmonisation. For instance, 
one of the documents maintains that  
 
“The EU can make an important contribution by working around the con-
flict issues, promoting similar reforms on both sides of the boundary lines, 
to foster convergence between political, economic and legal systems, en-
abling greater social inclusion and contributing to confidence building… 
In other cases, depending on the nature of the conflict, increasing the ca-
pacities of ministries dealing with refugees, promoting the integration of 
minorities  through  language  instruction,  supporting  post-conflict  infra-
structure rehabilitation, including cultural heritage, or implementing local Kratochvíl: Discursive Constructions in the Neighbourhood    17 
income generation projects can constitute appropriate confidence-building 
measures” (COM(2007): 6, emphasis in the original).  
 
Here, the EU, to a large degree, gives up its political power, which 
could directly contribute to the conflicts’ solution, and retreats back 
to the position of a benign actor who focuses on confidence build-
ing  and,  possibly,  post-conflict  measures.  Neither  the  synchronic 
nor the diachronic analysis reveals any substantial changes in the 
way frozen conflicts are tackled. Even in the two recent documents 
through which the Commission addressed the EU member states 
and where they are urged to take action, frozen conflicts are not 
linked to any concrete proposals, and the text remains superficially 
general for the most part (COM(2006) and COM(2007)).  
 
The most lucid example of how quickly the self-perceived domi-
nance of the EU in the neighbourhood recedes once it is challenged 
is the role of Russia in the frozen conflicts. Both EU institutions and 
EU member states cannot have any doubt that Russia is the key fac-
tor in the resolution of virtually every conflict in the Eastern neigh-
bourhood, and thus the discussion of the EU’s measures in the area 
of conflict resolution should undeniably also include the steps the 
EU  proposes  vis-à-vis  Russia.  However,  all  analysed  documents 
anxiously avoid any references to Russia in this context (for the 
only exception, see the general comment in COM(2006): 9).  
 
It would be premature to jump to the conclusion that the reason for 
this is the general tabooisation of Russia in the EU’s external poli-
cies, since that would mean that Russia would not be addressed at 
all. But this is not true. For instance, Wider Europe – Neighbour-
hood (COM(2003)) refers to Russia, among others, in the following 
areas: stake in the Internal Market, energy policy, cross-border co-
operation, legislative and regulatory approximation, lending from 
the European Investment Bank, etc.
6 But the part on frozen conflicts 
(op. cit.: 12) is entirely silent on Russia’s role. Also, the long sub-
chapter  on  “regional  conflicts”  in  the  communication  from  2007 
(COM(2007)  starts  the  list  of  frozen  conflicts  with  Transnistria, 
                                                 
6  We should bear in mind, however, that at the time of the release of Wider Eu-
rope – Neighbourhood, Russia was still expected to join the initiative. I thank 
one of the editors for this remark.   European Political Economy Review  
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Abkhazia and South Ossetia, all of which are directly linked to Rus-
sia’s involvement in these conflicts. But again, not a single refer-
ence is made to Russia’s role, and it remains completely unclear as 




4.   The Implication for the South/East Divide  
 
Although we started from the assumption that the previous tensions 
are no longer the key to understanding the current evolution of the 
ENP, they are still substantially influenced by the policy’s primary 
contradiction – the role the EU plays in the neighbourhood. Espe-
cially the tension between the South and the East is particularly re-
inforced by the different roles preferred by the EU.  
 
The first repercussion for the two geographical dimensions is obvi-
ous. The EU’s rhetoric toward the South is much more cautious, 
stressing the equality of the partnership. While this is clearly ap-
preciated by the Southern partners (or it is at least better appreciated 
than  the  approach  hidden  behind  the  Barcelona  Process),  at  the 
same time, it means that this cautiousness diminishes the chances of 
the South for a quick convergence with the EU. The Eastern part of 
the neighbourhood is, on the contrary, seen as an arena where the 
EU should act asymmetrically. As a result, both political condition-
ality and requirements for a stricter compliance in law harmonisa-
tion are palpable here.  
 
The result will undoubtedly be a gradual, if informal, differentiation 
between the Southern and the Eastern ENP partner countries. In the 
East,  this  will  be  reflected  both  on  the  symbolical  level,  for  in-
stance, through the probable replacement of ‘partnership and co-
operation agreements’ with “association agreements” or “enhanced 
agreements”, and on the level of practical policies. Here, the East-
ern neighbours’ prospects for attaining deep free trade areas, even-
tually extending to cover all four of the fundamental freedoms of 
the EU, stand much higher than those of most of the Southern part-
ners. 
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Surprisingly, our research revealed an opposite tendency as well. 
While  the  EU’s  status  as  a  dominant  power  is  virtually  unchal-
lenged in the South, Russia is rapidly rising in the East as a strategic 
competitor, offering the countries in the common neighbourhood an 
alternative model of governance. Indeed, with the growing disillu-
sionment  about  the  democratic  credentials  of  the  leaders  of  East 
European colour revolutions, and with Russia’s economic rise, the 
EU option is no more the only obvious way for many countries in 
the region. Although we could argue that Russia does not, in fact, 
offer any viable modernisation option, the public discourse in the 
partner countries may not be aware of these shortcomings. What the 
public is, nevertheless, clearly aware of is – as indicated above – the 
issue of frozen conflicts. It is in this area where the EU will either 
rise up to the challenge of dealing directly with the solutions to the 
conflicts, or its influence will dwindle. 
 
No matter whether the EU finds enough internal political will to 
become more deeply involved in the East or not, Russia’s presence 
in the Eastern neighbourhood further adds to the growing gap be-
tween the two regions. As a consequence, the EU will be required to 
develop distinct strategies to cope with the challenges particular to 
the East. The differentiation will be sooner of later palpable in the 
South as well. The different regional setting, the influence of other 
players (Iran, United States, etc.) and the fear of radical political 
Islam will mean a further separation of the approaches to the two 
regions. Even though the EU will most probably try to do so within 
the ENP framework, the policy’s internal consistency will necessa-
rily diminish.  
 
 
5.   Conclusion 
 
The  rhetoric  of  the  European  Commission  in  documents  dealing 
with the ENP is characterised by the tension between the two com-
peting roles the EU plays in the neighbourhood. On one hand, the 
documents maintain that the EU is a benign power whose primary 
objectives are the stability, prosperity and equality of the continent. 
On the other hand, the EU sees itself also as the hub in the integra-
tion process on the whole continent and as the dominant power, 
which  can  teach  others  and  invites  them  to  adopt  its  norms  and   European Political Economy Review  
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practices. No matter how strongly the equality of the relationship 
between the neighbours and the EU is stressed and how often the 
principle of joint ownership is invoked, the partnership is unequal 
for a number of reasons: It is the partner countries that carry out re-
forms that bring them closer to the EU and not vice versa, and it is 
the EU who decides about the rewards given for outstanding per-
formance. Legal harmonisation also translates into a one-sided ac-
quis adoption, to some extent not dissimilar to the enlargement pro-
cess. Hence, in the areas where the EU deals directly with reform in 
the partner countries, the EU’s dominance is the prevalent feature, 
and not its benign nature. This element is much stronger in the East 
than in the South, where historical experience and the unwillingness 
of the partners to accept political conditionality preclude the EU’s 
deeper engagement. 
 
On  the  other  hand,  the  EU’s  dominance  is  challenged  once  two 
conditions are fulfilled: First, when the EU has to tackle security 
concerns of or even disputes between the partner countries, the EU 
perceives  its  weakness  and  lacking  capabilities  and,  as  a  conse-
quence, it retreats to stressing its benign identity, striving not to take 
sides, and instead supports only indirect measures leading to con-
flict resolution. Second, this retreat from the position of dominance 
is farther strengthened when other external actors are present who 
challenge the EU’s self-identity as the dominant power and thrust 
their weight behind one of the conflicting parties. The resulting ten-
dency is to avoid tackling regional conflicts between partner count-
ries as well as to ignore the role external powers play in the con-
flicts. Since such a challenge is strongly felt in the East (Russia) and 
only much less so in the South (the United States and Iran), the re-
treat to softer policies is more obvious in the Eastern neighbour-
hood.  Moreover,  for  reasons  of  internal  disunity,  Russia  is  kept 
separate from the ENP. 
 
While both of these problems can be managed separately, taken to-
gether, they pose a grave danger to the success of the policy. The 
EU is unable to deal with regional conflicts to which high priority is 
given by partner countries, especially those in Eastern Europe. This 
causes a high level of frustration among the partners who criticise 
the EU for insufficient support and its low level of engagement in Kratochvíl: Discursive Constructions in the Neighbourhood    21 
the search for conflict solutions.
7 Finally, the EU’s perceived pas-
sivity  discourages  the  partners  from  aligning  themselves  more 
closely to the EU, and hence, the sense of local ownership is seri-
ously eroded. 
 
Ironically, the EU behaves as the dominant power in those areas 
where the partner countries would appreciate a more equal approach 
and more possibilities for expressing their dissatisfaction with the 
policy’s failures. But where a more resolute stance of the Union 
would be welcome (even though admittedly difficult), particularly 
when supporting the partner countries against the claims of external 
powers,  such  as  Russia  in  the  Moldovan  or  Georgian  cases,  the 
EU’s rhetoric loses its edge and reveals the limits of the EU’s capa-
bilities and determination to exploit its potential as the dominant 
power. 
 
Further research could proceed in two directions: The first candi-
date would be the exploration of conditions under which one of the 
other element of the EU’s identity prevails over the other. While the 
analysis of the two areas chosen shows that sometimes, the EU’s 
dominance takes upper hand and sometimes its benign nature, it 
remains  unclear  how  this  inconsistency  is  discursively  justified. 
Secondly, more attention should be dedicated to the alternative dis-
cursive strategies employed by the ENP partner countries. It would 
be certainly interesting to find out to what degree these discourses 
comply  with  the  EU’s  self-perception  and  whether  the  partner 
countries are more inclined to perceive the EU as a benign “equal 
among equals” or as the only regional power centre.
                                                 
7  On the disappointment in Georgia see Emerson, Noutcheva, Popescu 2007, but 
cf. also Popescu 2005.   European Political Economy Review  
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